INTRODUCTION 27
The welfare of farmed animals regulations (as amended) 2007, specifies the minimal legal standards that must be 28 complied with when farming animals in Great Britain (GB). Under the provision of the act, Department for Environment, 29
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) lay down a series of recommendations (codes) to promote the welfare of farmed 30 animals (Defra 2011). There is a statutory requirement for those responsible for the care of animals to be aware of 31 coverage of assurance schemes among commercial enterprises in these sectors is high. Farm assurance scheme 46 standards are set by the scheme provider and, in many schemes, compliance is assessed by a UK Accreditation 47 with legislation but not code (B), non compliance with legislation but no pain, distress or suffering obvious in the 124 animals (C) or evidence of unnecessary pain or unnecessary distress (D) in each area inspected. For the purposes of 125 analysis the most severe non-compliance of the areas inspected was used as the outcome variable for the inspection 126 of the enterprise. 127
128
With the exception of FF; all CPH numbers and postcodes in both the Animal Health and individual schemes' data 129 were standardised (i.e. spaces standardised, zeros amended) using an algorithm. Exceptional values were corrected 130 manually. After standardisation, the data for each scheme were matched with the Animal Health data by pairing CPH 131 numbers. When this did not result in a match, or where CPH numbers were not available, standardised postcodes 132 were used instead. All postcode-matched entries were checked by hand to ensure concordance of names and 133 addresses, any mismatches were excluded. FF data were matched with AH inspection records by their data 134 management company following the same protocol. To ensure confidentiality, no schemes were aware of which of 135 their members had been inspected and AH were not aware of which enterprises were members of schemes. 136
137
Enterprises were categorised as eligible or not eligible for membership of a participating scheme e.g. only pig 138 enterprises were eligible to be members of ABP. The certification dates were then used to identify whether an 139 enterprise was certified at the time of an AH inspection. They were then coded as known to be a member of the 140 scheme or not known to be a member. Some enterprises were members of more than one scheme. Enterprises that 141
were not a member of a participating scheme were coded as not known to be certified (from here on referred to as 'not 142 certified') this included enterprises in non-participating schemes. 143
144

Statistical analysis 145
The outcome variable was compliance with animal welfare legislation and code when inspected by AH. A binary 146 outcome was used; with AH codes A and B compared with AH codes C and D. Descriptive summaries of the number 147 and percent of inspections to enterprises were calculated by the outcome, year, visit type and enterprise type. 148
149
The data had a multilevel structure. To account for this clustering, 4-level hierarchical random effects models were 150 used with inspection (level 1) nested within enterprise (level 2) nested within location (with ≥ 1 enterprise, level 3) 151 nested within county (level 4). Models were built for each of four species groups; cattle, pigs, sheep and poultry. All 152 cattle enterprises were combined in one model because the data provided on AH inspections to calf and growing 153 cattle enterprises did not differentiate beef production from dairy, therefore these enterprises might be certified by beef 154 or dairy production schemes. 155
156
The logistic binomial models took the form; 157 Logit (p ijkl ) = β 0 + ∑βx ijkl + ∑βx ijk + ∑βx jk + ∑βx k + f l + v kl + u jkl 158
Where p ijkl = the probability of code C/D at an AH inspection, β 0 = constant, βx is a vector of fixed effects varying at 159 level 1 (ijkl), level 2 (jkl), level 3 (kl) or level 4 (l); i is inspection, j is enterprise, k is location and l is county, f l + v kl + u jkl 160 are the residuals at county, location and enterprise level respectively. Level 1 variance (ijkl) was restrained to a 161 binomial distribution. Where only one enterprise type was included in the model the random effect for enterprise was 162 omitted. MLwiN provide data for this project; one organic scheme, one poultry assurance scheme and one retailer scheme that has 181 UKAS accreditation for a small number of unusual enterprise types. There was little difference in the coefficients between organic and farm assured schemes (Table 7) . There was a 207 significantly increased risk of non compliance in caged laying hens and a reduced risk in growing cattle, calves, dairy 208 cattle, broilers / breeders, non caged laying hens, ducks, geese and turkey compared with breeding beef enterprises. 209
210
In cattle enterprises there was a significantly reduced risk of non compliance in assured and organic enterprises 211 compared with enterprises not certified by any of the study schemes (Table 7) . There was a significantly reduced risk 212 of non compliance in calf and dairy cattle enterprises compared with breeding beef enterprises. In sheep enterprises 213 there was a lower risk of non compliance in assured and organic enterprises compared with enterprises not certified 214 by any of the participating schemes. The reduction in risk was similar for the organic and assured groups but was not 215 statistically significant for organic enterprises, probably due to the small number of organic sheep farms that were 216 inspected (Table 7 ). In pigs there was a non significant trend for a reduced risk of non compliance in inspections of 217 assured and organic pig enterprises compared with pig enterprises not certified by any of the participating schemes 218 (Table 7) . 219
220
There was a lower risk of non compliance in assured and organic poultry enterprises compared with enterprises not 221 certified by any of the study schemes in inspections between 2003 and 2008 (Table 7) . This difference was 222 statistically significant for assured enterprises, but did not reach significance for organic enterprises. There was a 223 significantly increased risk of non compliance in inspections to caged laying hen enterprises compared with broiler 224 /breeder enterprises (Table 7) . When the poultry inspections from 2008 only were analysed there were just 27 225 inspections to organic poultry enterprises, all of which were compliant with welfare legislation (code A/B). Therefore 226 assured and organic enterprises were combined. In this combined category there was a significantly reduced risk of 227 non compliance in certified enterprises compared with enterprises not certified by any of the participating schemes 228 (Table 7) . 229
230
The association between the AH inspection outcome and inspection type, number of animals inspected and country 231 was controlled for in all models. There was a pattern of increased risk of non compliance in early years, Scotland 232 compared with England and when larger numbers of animals were inspected. These associations varied across the 233 enterprise types, see Table 7 for details. 234
The current study provides evidence that enterprises that were in a farm assurance or organic certification scheme at 237 the time that they were inspected by AH were more likely to be compliant with animal welfare legislation compared 238 with enterprises that were not known to be certified at the time of inspection. Some assurance schemes did not or 239 could not provide data for the analysis and others could not provide complete data, consequently, there are likely to be 240 some enterprises misclassified as non certified when they were in a certification scheme at the time of inspection. 241
Given the consistent pattern of higher compliance in enterprises known to be in a scheme (Table 7) , it is likely that the 242 difference in risk associated with certification status would have been greater than that estimated in the current 243 analysis if all enterprises were correctly coded; that is, the difference in risk is underestimated in the current analysis. 244
245
Although certified enterprises were more likely to be compliant with welfare legislation, this does not necessarily imply 246 a causal relationship between membership of a farm assurance or organic scheme and higher compliance with 247 welfare legislation, merely an association. The association could be causal, that is, joining a scheme improved 248 welfare e.g. because the extra inspections from the scheme improved compliance with legislation. The association 249 could also occur because farmers who comply with welfare legislation are more likely to be a member of a scheme. To 250 test whether membership of a scheme improves compliance with welfare legislation, a study of farms joining and 251 leaving schemes and the results from AH inspections over time would be required. In practice these data would not be 252 available as scheme membership is now relatively stable. The current analysis needs to be repeated in future to test 253 whether enterprises in a farm assurance or organic certification scheme continue to be at lower risk of breaching 254 welfare legislation. 255
256
There was no significant difference in the level of compliance between organic certification and farm assurance 257 schemes (Table 7) . This does not imply that animal welfare per se was the same in these two systems, rather, that 258 compliance with animal welfare legislation monitored through inspections was not significantly different. Schemes that 259 have higher welfare standards than those legally required would not be differentiated from those that have the 260 minimum legal standards on the basis of AH inspections. To capture data to compare welfare across systems it would 261 be necessary to take an approach similar to that used by Main and others (2003), where behaviour and physical 262 condition of the animals were independently assessed. This is particularly relevant for organic poultry and pig 263 production where extensive systems are one of the features that differentiate them from many farms in non-organic 264 production. For example, the greater potential to express a larger repertoire of behaviour in non caged hens versus 265 caged hens is not part of the assessment currently used by AH. 266
However, the importance of AH inspections is illustrated by the proportion that detected non compliance with welfare 268 legislation; 31%, 19% and 13% of inspections to non certified, farm assured and organic enterprises respectively 269 (Tables 4 and 5 ). The onus for compliance with legislation remains with the producer whether in a scheme or not, but 270 the results raise the question how the schemes might improve compliance among their members further and to move 271 closer to their aim of being able to assure the welfare of all animals certified under their schemes. As highlighted by 272 the schemes themselves, feedback from AH inspections (even if aggregated to preserve anonymity of the individual 273 farmer) would be useful for scheme providers to identify areas where their members need to improve standards so 274 that further education and guidance could be given to all members. 275
276
The proportion of inspections to certified enterprises is considerably lower than the proportion of production that is 277 reported to be certified. This may be explained by the fact that there are large numbers of small enterprises that are 278 not certified. In this study certified enterprises had almost three times the number of animals present at the time of The accuracy of the data provided by the schemes is unknown but the authors did liaise closely with the schemes to 284 ensure that the data provided was interpreted correctly. The data used in the current analysis are of the quality that 285 would be available to AH for use in a risk-based selection of inspections to enterprises and so, whilst a complete 286 dataset with all members of all schemes for all years would be a more robust statistical analysis, the results obtained 287 from this analysis are useful. 288
There were other factors that were associated with compliance with welfare legislation. There was some indication 289 that compliance improved in 2007 and 2008, however, this might be explained by the introduction of separate 290 categorisation of random and risk based visits to fulfil EU regulations with cross compliance, both of which had higher 291 compliance than the other visits types (Table 4 ). There were also significant differences in compliance with legislation 292 between enterprise types. These differences may be linked to enterprise types where there is more legislation 293 controlling production but this could also be due to an ascertainment bias because sheep and beef production 294 systems are more often to the public and so complaints were more common. In future years the random inspections 295 that AH carry out will provide a useful source of baseline data to investigate whether there is a real difference in 296 farmer compliance with welfare legislation between enterprise types. 297
In conclusion, enterprises in a farm assurance or organic certification scheme at the time of an AH inspection between 298 that membership of a scheme could be included in AH's risk based selection for inspections of enterprises as part of 300 surveillance of animal welfare. Animal Health's welfare inspections are necessary as an indicator of welfare 301 infringement and are likely to continue to be necessary given that there is non-compliance both certified and 302 
